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THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM*
PETER W. HOGG *
Recent developments in Canadian constitutional law have stimulated a great deal of debate
and controversy over the value and content of constitutional reform. Areas in which such
reform could be carried out include the division of powers, central institutions, a charter of
rights and patriation and amendment procedures. The author discusses these areas in the
context of the forces he perceives to be motivating the present trend in favour of constitu-
tional change. He also provides a discussion of the present reform process and concludes
with an overview of the reform mechanism which he would like to see implemented.
I. IS CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM NECESSARY?
The major forces propelling the movement for constitutional reform in
Canada are French-Canadian nationalism and western regionalism.1
French Canadians are a minority in the nation as a whole, but a majority in
the province of Quebec. The French language and the cultural attributes
which tend to cling to a language have made the French Canadians a distinc-
tive people. This distinctiveness, nurtured by the memory of the conquest by
the English and the constant danger of assimilation, has made them anxious
to be masters in their own house. At one extreme this involves a separate
nation in the territory of Quebec. But for those French Canadians in Quebec
who are not separatists it has led to demands for greater power in the provin-
cial government in Quebec City - the government which is controlled by a
French-Canadian majority.
Western regionalism is not based on a distinctive language or culture, but
on the distinctive economic base of the four western provinces. Their
economies depend upon primary production - of grain, metals, wood, pulp,
and, of course, oil and gas. Because the bulk of Canada's population is con-
centrated in Ontario and Quebec, federal policies have tended to favour the
manufacturing industries and the consumers of central Canada. This ten-
dency is reflected in the tariffs which protect domestic manufacturing, in
transportation policies, and most recently and dramatically, in federal
control of the price of oil and gas. A logical response by western Canadians
has been to seek to reduce the power of the central government which they
cannot control and to enhance the powers of the provincial governments
which they can control.
It is obvious that the forces of French-Canadian nationalism and western
regionalism will have to be accommodated if the country is to stay together.
What is not so obvious is that this accommodation needs to take the form of
. This article is a revised version of the Clinton J. Ford lecture, which was delivered at the
University of Alberta on February 12, 1981. It was prepared while I was a visiting pro-
fessor in the law faculty of the University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C.. I am very grateful to
my colleagues there, Professors Ronald I. Cheffins and James C. MacPherson, who each
read an earlier draft of the paper and made extensive and helpful criticisms of it.
* * Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
1. For excellent recent diagnoses of Canada's constitutional ills, see K. M. Lysyk, "Reshaping
Canadian Federalism" (1979) 13 U.B.C. L. Rev. 1; Paul C. Weiler, "Confederation Dis-
contents and Constitutional Reform" (1979) 29 U. Toronto L.J. 253; The Task Force on
Canadian Unity, A Future Together (1979).
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constitutional change. It must be remembered that there have been several
major shifts in the balance of power since Confederation which were not
accompanied by changes in the formal constitutional instruments.2 One may
reasonably conclude that constitutional reform may not be necessary to
accommodate Canada's dualist and regional forces. However, that is not the
conclusion which has been reached by the various groups which have recent-
ly made official studies of the constitution. Each of them has recommended
constitutional reform.3
There are other, less pressing, reasons for seeking constitutional change.
First, there is the idea that Canada should rid itself of the remaining vestiges
of its colonial past. The most obvious measure to this end is the "patriation"
of the constitution, ending once and for all the British power to legislate for
Canada. As well, obsolete portions of the British North America Act could be
repealed, its name changed, and some modernization of language attempted.
Secondly, and related to the first point, Canada should insert a domestic
amending formula into its constitution not only so that amendment can take
place without recourse to the United Kingdom but so that the respective
roles of the federal and provincial governments and the voters in the
amending process should be clearly defined for the first time. Thirdly, there
is the impulse to protect the civil liberties of individuals through the inclu-
sion of a charter of rights in the constitution. Fourthly, even granting the
necessity in general for increased provincial powers, there is a strong case for
2. See P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (1977), chs. 3,4.
3. The recent studies, to which reference will be made in this article, are as follows:
Victoria Charter (1971).
Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, Report on the
Constitution of Canada (Canada, 1972).
Ontario Advisory Committee on Confederation, First Report (April 1978), Second Report(March 1979) (Toronto).
Government of Canada, A Time for Action: Toward the Renewal of the Canadian Federa-
tion (June 1978) and Bill C-60 (June 1978).
Canadian Bar Association Committee on the Constitution, Towards a New Canada(Canadian Bar Association, August 1978).
Government of British Columbia,British Columbia s ConstitutionalProposals (Province of
British Columbia, September 1978).
Government of Alberta,Harmony in Diversity: A New Federalism for Canada (Province of
Alberta, October 1978).
Western Premiers Task Force on Constitutional Trends, First Report (May 1977), Second
Report (April 1978), Third Report (March 1979).
The Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future Together (Minister of Supply and Services,
Canada, January 1979).
The Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberal Party, A New Canadian Federation
(The Quebec Liberal Party, Montreal, Quebec, January 1980).
Proposed resolution for enactment of the Constitution Act, 1980.
A 43-page summary of the recommendations of these studies has been prepared by the
author's research assistant, Elizabeth A. Brown. It is available on request and upon
payment of photocopying costs.
4. At the time of writing (March 1981) the federal Parliament is debating a resolution for ajoint address to the United Kingdom government requesting the enactment by the United
Kingdom Parliament of a set of amendments to the Canadian constitution, including its
patriation, the adoption of an amending formula, and a charter of rights. The legality of the
proposed resolution has been challenged by six provincial governnments in the courts of
Manitoba, Quebec and Newfoundland, on the basis that the proposed amendments have not
been agreed to by a majority of provinces.
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the enlargement of certain federal powers to enable effective national action
in some areas of economic policy where federal power is lacking or unclear or
present only in an emergency, for example, competition policy, foreign
ownership, securities regulation and wage and price controls.
Arising from all these various impulses the following areas of constitu-
tional reform require consideration: (1) the division of powers; (2) central in-
stitutions; (3) a charter of rights; and (4) patriation and amendment. A final
section of the paper will examine the reform process.
II. DIVISION OF POWERS
As noted earlier, the most obvious way to redress the grievances of French
Canadians and western Canadians is to reduce the powers of the federal
government, which they do not control, and to increase the powers of the pro-
vincial governments, which they do control.
The provinces already have very extensive legislative powers, mainly as
the result of the broad interpretation which the courts have given to the
phrase "property and civil rights in the province" in s.92(13) of the B.N.A.
Act. Some of the federal Parliament's ostensibly large powers have been
little used, at least in recent years (disallowance under s.90; declaratory
power under s.92(10Xc); redress of educational grievances under s.93), and
others have been given a narrow interpretation, at least in contrast with the
powers of the United States Congress (peace, order, and good government
under s.91's opening words, trade and commerce under s.91(2)). In this way
the Canadian confederation has already evolved into a much less centralized
system than the literal language of the B.N.A. Act would suggest.'
Nevertheless, there is still an agenda of items upon which formal constitu-
tional change has been actively considered in recent years. In the cultural
area these include transferring to the provinces some aspects of control over
telecommunications, especially cable television, and transferring mar-
riage and divorce to the provinces. In the resource area these include
transferring to the provinces the power over indirect taxation of resource
revenues, some powers over the interprovincial and international trade in
resources, responsibility for fisheries, and transferring ownership of
offshore resources to the coastal provinces. Other reform proposals include:
limiting the federal peace, order, and good government power over
emergencies and over matters of national concern, and transferring the
residue of legislative power to the provinces; limiting or abolishing the
federal declaratory power; and limiting the federal spending power.
It has proved very difficult for the Prime Minister and premiers to agree on
a list of matters which could be transferred to the provinces. Superficially,
the problem appears to be the refusal of the federal government to reduce its
own powers by acceding to provincial demands. Certainly, that is a big part
of the problem, which will be discussed later in this paper. But, as well, it
must be conceded that there are serious difficulties in a major decentrali-
zation of governmental power in Canada.
First of all, the provinces differ in their aspirations. The concerns of
French Canadians focus on language and culture. The concerns of western
5. Hogg, supra n. 2 at 35-41.
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Canadians and to a lesser extent eastern Canadians focus on resources.
About the only common thread linking all the provinces would be a desire for
more power to control the province's economic development, but even here
provincial governments would differ markedly in their assessment of what
could properly be left to federal policies.
Secondly, the provinces differ in their capacities. The size and wealth of
the provinces differ enormously.6 The smaller provinces lack the capacity to
increase their responsibilities to any great extent. Moreover, they have
reason to resist any substantial diminution of federal power and influence.
They are dependent on the federal funding of equalization and shared-cost
programmes to maintain the standard of living of their residents. They are
also dependent upon the federal government for protection from the
unintended adverse effects of the policies of other provinces, for example,
energy prices.7
Thirdly, there is a concern that the process of decentralization can go too
far. At some undefined point the effectiveness of a central government could
be seriously compromised, and popular identification with the nation as a
whole could be seriously diminished. The decentralization of powers has the
rather frightening aspect of a leap into the dark since Prime Minister
Trudeau's oft-repeated claim that Canada is already the most decentralized
federal country in the world is probably true. Certainly, in both legal and
political terms, the legislative and fiscal powers of the Canadian provinces
relative to the central government are much greater than those of the Ameri-
can states or Australian states relative to their central governments. In pro-
ceeding down the path of decentralization Canadians are denied the comfort
of knowing that others have made the journey successfully before.
Fourthly, proposals for increases in the powers of the provinces inevitably
invite counter-proposals from the federal government. A charter of rights
would perhaps fall into this category.8 But, as noted earlier, federal power is
not clear and may well be deficient in one area which is generally accepted as
an appropriate sphere of federal responsibility, namely, competition policy.
6. A union of the Maritime provinces would help to equalize the size of the provinces, but it
seems unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future.
7. "Special status", under which one or more provinces could have different powers than the
others, is a possible answer to the differing aspirations and capacities of the provinces.
However, special status raises difficult questions about the role in the central institutions,
especially the federal Parliament, of the representatives of the province (or provinces)
enjoying special status. It seems wrong that they should participate in decisions which in
their province are a provincial responsibility. Yet their participation may be necessary to
retain a government majority. Political scientists have not yet found answers to these
questions.
8. The argument is sometimes made that an increase in provincial powers should be accom-
panied by the adoption of a charter of rights on the ground that the provinces, being
smaller, more homogeneous units than the federal government, will tend to be less tolerant
of their minorities than the federal government. And it is, of course, true that several of the
provinces can find in their history a chapter of discrimination against a minority of French-
speakers, or Chinese or Japanese immigrants, or political or religious dissenters. The
difficulty with the argument is that the federal government's record is about equally
blemished, especially in times of war (Japanese-Canadians case) or "apprehended insurrec-
tion" (FLQ crisis of October 1970), or where "national security" is thought to be at stake
(RCMP abuses).
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In several other areas the federal presence is more controversial, namely,
foreign ownership, securities regulation and wage and price controls.
The assembly of a package of changes which responds so successfully to all
these conflicting concerns that it is acceptable to all Canadian governments
is an extraordinarily difficult task. It is only realistic to acknowledge that a
substantial alteration of the division of powers in the Canadian constitution
is neither practicable nor desirable.
III. CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Intrastate federalism
A different approach to constitutional change concentrates on reforming
the institutions of the federal government so that regional attitudes and in-
terests are more effectively represented within those institutions. The
theory is that "the more effectively these attitudes and interests are repre-
sented within the central institutions the wider the range of powers which
may be conferred on such institutions".9 If French Canadians and western
Canadians could be confident that their interests would be fairly accom-
modated in the development of federal policies, then, so the argument goes,
they would have less reason to demand that powers be transferred from fed-
eral institutions to provincial institutions. Thus, the reform of central insti-
tutions becomes an alternative to decentralization of powers as a means of re-
dressing regional grievances. This approach to constitutional change has
been dubbed "intrastate federalism" by political scientists - in contrast to
"interstate federalism", which involves the decentralization of powers.10
B. Senate
The most popular application of intrastate federalism by constitutional
reformers has been to the Senate, the upper house of the federal Parliament.
Most reform proposals have advocated changes in the Senate. The proposals
differ markedly in detail and in nomenclature, but the general idea, modelled
on West Germany's upper house (the Bundesrat), is to convert the Senate
into a "House of the Provinces" with members appointed by provincial gov-
ernments. This would then become the means by which provincial govern-
ments could exercise a direct influence over federal policies.
One of the attractions of upper house reform is that the representation of
regional interests is regarded as a function of the second chamber in other
federal systems, and the Senate was originally intended to serve a function
of this kind.1' Its membership was drawn equally from the three original
regions of Canada, namely, Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritime provinces.
The West later became a fourth region. 2 The plan was to offset representa-
9. Donald V. Smiley, "Central Institutions" (1981), paper prepared for the Project on Con-
stitutional Change undertaken jointly by the Osgoode Hall Law School, York University
and the Faculte de Droit, Universitd de Montrdal, not yet published, at 2.
10. The paper cited in the previous note is an excellent analysis by a political scientist of intra-
state federalism in Canada.
11. R. L. Watts, "Second Chambers in Federal Political Systems" in 2 Ontario Advisory Com-
mittee on Confederation, Background Papers and Reports (1970) 315.
12. British Columbia argues that the West is two distinct regions, namely, the Prairie region
(Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba) and the Pacific region (British Columbia), and that
Senate representation (as well as membership of the Supreme Court and any amending
formula) should recognize five, not four, regions. This case is very persuasively made in
British Columbia's Constitutional Proposals, supra n. 3, Paper No. 2. '
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tion by population in the House of Commons by equality of regions in the
membership of the Senate. With hindsight we can see that this plan was
fatally flawed because the Senators were to be appointed rather than elected,
and to be appointed by the federal government rather than by provincial
governments. In any event, the Senate has never been an effective voice of
regional or provincial interests.
Whether it is now feasible to reform the federal upper house so as to
restore the original plan is doubtful, at least without substantial change in
our system of government. The difficulty is that in a system of responsible
government the cabinet is responsible to the House of Commons, not to the
Senate (or other upper house). If government policy is defeated in the House
of Commons, then the government must resign and make way, either for a
new government which can command the support of the House of Commons,
or for an election which will provide a new House of Commons. An upper
house has no obvious place in this scheme of things. That is why in so many
jurisdictions with parliamentary systems the upper house has been
abolished or reduced to impotence. And that is why the assertions of inde-
pendence by the Australian Senate which led to the dismissal of Prime
Minister Whitlam in 1975 were so bitterly controversial in that country. An
independent upper house could block major governmental policies, could
refuse to vote supply to the government (which is what the Australian
Senate did), and could eventually bring the government down (as occurred in
Australia), and yet an upper house appointed by the provinces would not be
accountable to the people for its actions. Do we really want to subject our
federal governments to the risk of this kind of obstruction?
The reform proposals avoid the risk of major obstruction by also proposing
limitations on the powers of any new upper house. The powers would be
divided into two categories: category A, into which most legislation would
fall, would be only a power of delay; and category B, which would include
only matters judged to be of great importance to the provinces, would be an
absolute veto. The kinds of matters subject to the absolute veto would be:
appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada and major federal adminis-
trative agencies; proposals to amend the constitution; exercises of the declar-
atory power; and exercises of the spending power in areas of provincial juris-
diction. To the extent that the absolute veto power is enlarged, so also is the
capacity of the House of the Provinces to obstruct government policy." To
the extent that the absolute veto power is limited, so also is the capacity of
the House of the Provinces effectively to assert regional and provincial
interests, although no doubt even the delaying power would provide some
measure of influence.
C. House of Commons
The basic complaint against the House of Commons by regional minorities
is that representation by population leaves them subject to the tyranny of
the majority. So long as we believe in a democratic system in which each per-
son's vote is equal the position of regional minorities in the House of
Commons cannot be radically improved. It is arguable, however, that our
13. Weiler, supra n. 1, criticizes proposals for a House of the Provinces on the ground that the
capacity of the federal government to manage the economy would be weakened by the
proposals.
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electoral system has exacerbated the problem, and that the representation of
regional minorities in the House of Commons could be somewhat improved
by reform of the electoral system.
The representation of regional minorities in the House of Commons is
affected by the fact that the regional diversity of Canada has come to be
reflected in the popular support for the major political parties. The Liberal
Party consistently attracts the support of a large majority of French Cana-
dians and a small minority of western Canadians. The Progressive Conserva-
tive Party consistently attracts the support of a large majority of western
Canadians and a small minority of French Canadians. The electoral system
tends to exacerbate the regional character of the parties. The effect of the
single-member, majority-vote constituency system is that a minority party
whose supporters are spread fairly evenly across constituencies may fail to
be the first past the post in any constituency and hence may fail to elect any
members of Parliament. For this reason the Liberal Party tends to elect very
few members from west of Ontario (it elected two in the last (1980) federal
election), and the Progressive Conservative Party tends to elect very few
members from Quebec (it elected one in the last (1980) federal election). In
practice this skewed electoral result has worked in favour of French Canada
because it is the Liberal Party, with its disproportionate representation from
Quebec, that has won most federal elections since 1896. (As an aside it may
be noticed that the disproportionate representation of French Canadians in
federal government caucuses and cabinets over such a long period of time
casts doubt upon the whole theory of intrastate federalism, for it has not
stopped the rise of Quebec nationalism which has steadily increased in
intensity culminating with the election of a separatist party in 1976 and a
40% vote for the negotiation of sovereignty-association in 1979). It is
western Canada which has been virtually shut out of successive federal gov-
ernments by the skewed electoral results, and it can hardly be doubted that
federal economic policies have on the whole tended to favour the manufac-
turers and consumers of central Canada at the expense of western Canada.
It is arguable that this problem is best resolved by political means. The Pro-
gressive Conservative Party has every incentive to build a base in Quebec
and turn itself into a truly national party. It would then be a much more
serious opposition to the Liberal Party which would in turn be forced to
broaden its own political base by developing policies more congenial to
western Canada. It is difficult to understand why these developments did
not occur long ago.14
Since the political parties have not been able to accommodate regional
interests, political scientists have recently suggested that a reform of the
electoral system would mitigate the problem."5 The proposed reform is the
introduction of partial proportional representation into elections to the
House of Commons. No one seriously advocates the abolition of single-
14. The explanation usually given for the failure of the Progressive Conservative Party's ef.
forts to achieve substantial support in Quebec is French-Canadian resentment over the
hanging of Riel by the Conservative government of John A. Macdonald, and over Conser-
vative pressure for conscription in the two world wars. These events occurred a long time
ago.
15. The most comprehensive study is W. P. Irvine,Does CanadaNeed a New Electoral System?
(1979).
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member constituencies, but the proposal is that a portion of the seats in the
House of Commons would be filled on the basis of proportional representa-
tion.16 A bewildering variety of schemes has been suggested by political
scientists to accomplish this result, but they all depend upon the proposition
that if several members are elected from a province or region by proportional
representation significant minority parties are bound to secure new
members. This would ensure that each major party had representation in the
House of Commons from all major regions of the country. Through propor-
tional representation some Liberals would be elected from the West and
some Conservatives from Quebec; these individuals, it is argued, would
become spokesmen for their regions in the caucus of their party and, if the
party was in power, in the cabinet.
Although not qualified to comment on these proposals for electoral
reform, I shall make some brief comments. One is that the reform does
address itself to the existing centres of federal power, namely, the House of
Commons and the cabinet. It lacks the boldness of upper house reform,
which seeks to transform a weak institution into a powerful one, but it also
lacks the risk of failure which is inherent in all attempts to alter longstand-
ing institutions. However, the assured success of the partial proportional
representation plan is a very modest success. All that will indubitably follow
is the introduction into the major party caucuses of a few extra members
from regions now badly under-represented. The fact that most members will
still be elected from single-member constituencies ensures that the electoral
results will still be quite badly skewed. Moreover, it is hard to know what
calibre of person will secure a place on his party's list, and whether those
elected by proportional representation (who will lack constituencies) will be
perceived by the Prime Minister and their colleagues as second-class
members. Finally, the increased representation of minority parties will
slightly increase the risk of minority governments. This last criticism is not
very strong because the present system does not deliver majority govern-
ments with impressive regularity: of the eleven federal general elections
between 1957 and 1980 inclusive only five have produced majority govern-
ments. We have thus grown accustomed to the likelihood of minority govern-
ment, and some of us have even come to find merit in it.
D. Supreme Court of Canada
The Supreme Court of Canada is the other central institution to which the
idea of intrastate federalism has been applied in recent reform proposals.
The composition of the court already reflects Canada's regional and linguis-
tic differences. The Supreme Court Act stipulates that three of the nine
judges must be appointed from Quebec. By convention the remaining six
judges have been appointed as follows: three from Ontario, two from the four
western provinces, and one from the Atlantic provinces. This distribution
did not recognize British Columbia as a distinct region, which has been a
central (and plausible) tenet of British Columbia's constitutional
aspirations," and in 1978, on the retirement of a judge from Ontario (Spence
16. Of the official reform studies (see n. 3), only the Task Force on Canadian Unity
(pp. 104-106) has made this recommendation, although the Constitutional Committee of
the Quebec Liberal Party (pp. 46-47) recommended that the proposal be studied.
17. See supra n. 12.
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J.), a judge from British Columbia (McIntyre J.)was appointed. This altered
the pattern of appointment which had been consistently adhered to since
1949 when the court's composition was raised from seven to nine judges.
The nature of the judicial function, as understood in Canada and other
countries in which the judiciary is independent, does not allow a judge to
"represent" the region from which he was appointed in any direct sense, and
certainly does not allow the judge to favour the arguments of persons or gov-
ernments from that region. What regional representation does do, however,
is to ensure that there are judges on the court who are personally familiar
with each major region of the country, and who can bring to the decision of a
case from that region an understanding of the region's distinctive legal,
social and economic character. When the court does not sit as a full bench one
finds that the judge or judges from the region from which each appeal ori-
ginated are nearly always assigned to that appeal; and that one of those
judges will usually write the opinion of the majority. Many criticisms have
been levelled at the Supreme Court of Canada, but I do not think it has ever
displayed the ignorance of Canadian ways of which the Privy Council was
occasionally guilty.
The regional composition of the court must enhance the sensitivity and
acceptability of its opinions, but the structure of the court has still attracted
some strong criticisms which reveal considerable discontent, especially in
Quebec and western Canada. 8
The first point of criticism is that the court's existence and jurisdiction are
not guaranteed by the B.N.A. Act. The court's existence and jurisdiction de-
pend upon the Supreme Court Act, which is a federal statute enacted under
s.101 of the B.N.A. Act. As a matter of strict law, therefore, the court could
be abolished or radically altered by the federal Parliament. Of course, this is
not a practical possibility. Nevertheless, all the reform studies agree that the
existence and jurisdiction of the court should be entrenched in the constitu-
tion so that the court is outside the reach of federal legislative power. While
this proposal is uncontroversial, it should be noticed that its wise implemen-
tation will be quite difficult. The matters dealt with in the constitutional text
will become unchangeable except by constitutional amendment. That is the
whole point of the exercise. But if too much detail is incorporated in the con-
stitutional text then the kinds of incremental change in the composition or
powers of the court which have occurred in the past will become exceedingly
difficult in the future.
A second criticism of the structure of the court is that the judges of the
court are appointed solely by the federal government. All the reform studies
argue that the provinces should play a role in the selection of judges to the
court. This can be accomplished either by giving to each provincial
government (for example, the provincial Attorney General) a direct role in
the selection of a judge from that province, or by giving to provincial
governments an indirect role by requiring ratification of federal selections
18. The most comprehensive study of proposals to reform the Supreme Court of Canada is
James C. MacPherson, "The Potential Implications of Constitutional Reform for the
Supreme Court of Canada" (1981), paper prepared for the Project on Constitutional
Change undertaken jointly by the Osgoode Hall Law School of York University and the
Facult4 de Droit, Universit6 de Montr6al, not yet published.
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by a new House of the Provinces. The former method has the potential to be
rather complex and time-consuming and to subject judicial appointments to
a process of intergovernmental bargaining which may well not yield the best
candidate for the position. Still, it cannot be rejected out of hand since it is
essential that provincial governments should have complete confidence in
the court. If the initial selection continued to be made by the federal
government alone, a provincial role can still be provided by a process of
ratification by a House of the Provinces or other legislative body or
committee upon which the provinces are represented.
A third point of criticism is that there are too few judges from Quebec on
the court. As noted earlier, the present position, mandated by the Supreme
Court Act, is that three of the nine judges must come from Quebec. The argu-
ment that three is too few depends upon an evaluation of the court's capacity
to decide three classes of cases: (1) those in which the record and argument
are in the French language, (2) those raising issues of civil law, and (3) those
raising constitutional issues. The argument for increased representation
from Quebec is quite strong with respect to the first two classes of case. Thejudges from Quebec would have a perfect fluency in French and a familiarity
with the civil law which the judges from outside Quebec would often lack."9
The argument that there should be more judges from Quebec to decide con-
stitutional cases is not as strong. This argument, which has naturally tended
to come from Quebec commentators, depends upon the premise that Quebec
has a special stake in the outcome of constitutional controversies. With
respect to some issues that premise is correct. Issues of culture and language,
such as those raised by the recent cable television and language cases,
probably do have a deeper impact in Quebec than elsewhere. But with
respect to other issues that view is incorrect. Issues of resource ownership or
control are of much greater interest to the western provinces and (in the case
of offshore resources) coastal provinces than they are to Quebec. Many other
issues, for example, those relating to consumer protection or economic devel-
opment, while they are of great importance in Quebec, have an equally signi-
ficant impact in other provinces. It seems, therefore, that for many consti-
tutional issues a larger complement of judges from Quebec (and therefore a
relatively smaller complement from the other parts of the country) would
not lead to better informed decision-making, and might even lead to resent-
ment in the under-represented parts of the country. I conclude that the case
for larger Quebec representation on the court should turn on the capacity of
the court to handle French-language and civil-law cases, rather than on the
capacity of the court to handle constitutional cases.
If it is agreed that there should be more judges from Quebec on the court,
the details of that change are still difficult to work out. Any increase inQuebec's numbers involves either a decrease in the numbers drawn from
19. In view of the fact that the court's composition changes no generalization can be absolutely
correct. But I think it is fair to speculate that the judges from outside Quebec, while they
would no doubt always be able to read and understand French, would not usually be
sufficiently fluent to play an active part in oral argument. Certainly, it must be rare that a
judge from outside Quebec would have received training in the civil law or would have been
extensively exposed to it in practice. The converse would not usually be true, that is to say,
the judges from Quebec would usually be fluent in English and would usually be familiar
with common law modes of reasoning.
ALBERTA LAW REVIEW [VOL.XIX NO.3
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
other regions or an increase in the size of the court. The former alternative is
particularly hard to defend. It seems unlikely that the western provinces
would agree to reduce their representation on the court, since they have been
especially critical of the court's treatment of resource-related issues. The
Atlantic provinces have only one judge anyway. That leaves Ontario. If
Ontario were to give up one of its three judges to British Columbia (as may
already have happened) and another to Quebec, only one judge would be
drawn from the province which contains the largest number of lawyers and a
very sophisticated bar. That would seem to be an unwise limitation of the
selection process. The other way of increasing the number of judges on the
court from Quebec would be to increase the size of the court to eleven, thus
providing two more places to allocate. This would enable Quebec's represen-
tation to be increased to four or five, depending upon whether Ontario
should be "given back" the place now filled from British Columbia. This may
be the best answer, although as the court increases in size there are risks to
the quality of the oral argument before the court and to the collegiality of the
court, which may lead to more fragmentation and more delay in the court's
decisions.
Finally, in proposals to restructure the Supreme Court of Canada, it has
occasionally been suggested that there should be a special constitutional
court, or a special constitutional panel of the present court, to decide consti-
tutional cases. This suggestion has not been accepted by any of the recent
reform studies. Support for this proposal has often come from Quebec and
has been premised on a dualist view of Canada under which constitutional
issues should be determined by a tribunal upon which French Canada has an
equal voice with English Canada.21 As noted earlier, this is a dubious proposi-
tion having regard to the range and variety of constitutional issues which
have as much or more impact on provinces other than Quebec. To the extent
that the proposal for a constitutional court is premised on the desire to
assemble a broader range of talented individuals (not necessarily lawyers) to
decide constitutional cases, 2 it involves the risk of creating an active policy-
making body which is not amenable to any of the processes of democratic
accountability. And, as a technical matter, there is good reason not to try to
decide constitutional issues in isolation from the other elements of a justici-
able controversy which supply the context and colour and are in my view in-
dispensable to wise constitutional decision-making. My conclusion is that
judicial review should continue to be the function of the same Supreme Court
of Canada that serves as a general court of appeal for Canada.2"
20. The Government of Alberta inHarmony in Diversity, supra n. 3 at 11, has advocated that
constitutional cases be withdrawn from the Supreme Court and entrusted to a bench of
seven judges drawn at random from a panel of forty or fifty judges of provincial superior
courts. The Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberal Party, A New Canadian
Federation (1980) 58-60, proposes that "on request" a constitutional case should be
submitted to "a dualist constitutional bench composed of an equal number of judges from
Quebec and from the other provinces".
21. See J. Y. Morin, "A Constitutional Court for Canada" (1965)43 Can. Bar Rev. 545;and see
the proposal of the Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberal Party, supra n. 20.
22. See Paul C. Weiler, "What the Supreme Court is Doing to the Constitution and What
Constitutional Reform May Do to the Court", Ladner lecture delivered at the University of
British Columbia, 1980, not yet published.
23. Accord, MacPherson, supra n. 18 at 35-38; Hogg, supra n. 2 at 48.
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IV. CHARTER OF RIGHTS
Since the Second World War it has become widely accepted that a nation's
constitution should include protections for minority rights and other civil
libertarian values. A charter of rights has therefore become an indispensable
part of the constitution of each of those countries which have attained
independence since then. Naturally, the absence of extensive bill-of-rights
guarantees in the B.N.A. Act has attracted the attention of reformers. Most
of the recent reform studies have recommended the adoption of a charter of
human rights, binding on both the federal government and the provincial
governments.
The desirability of a bill of rights is a difficult issue, involving assessments
of the relative capacities of the political institutions and the courts to resolve
civil libertarian issues in ways that will respect civil libertarian values with-
out frustrating social change. I do not propose to add to the mountain of liter-
ature on that topic. 24 However I do wish to emphasize the implications of a
charter of human rights for federal-provincial relationships.
An effective charter of rights will limit the powers of both levels of govern-
ment and in that sense will not change the balance of power within Confeder-
ation. On a subtler analysis, however, it seems that a charter of rights is a
centralizing influence. The institutions to which a charter of rights
inevitably accords extra power are the courts and therefore ultimately the
Supreme Court of Canada. Issues that are now decided conclusively by the
federal Parliament or the provincial Legislatures would become subject to
review by the Supreme Court of Canada. If the charter of rights includes
guarantees of equal protection, of mobility from province to province, and of
language rights, then a very important range of decisions now within pro-
vincial responsibility will become subject to review by the Supreme Court of
Canada. One need only look south to the United States to see how deeply the
decisions of the Supreme Court have penetrated all of the major policies of
that country, many of them otherwise within state jurisdiction. In addition,
the existence of national rights which can be invoked against provincial
Legislatures encourages individuals to think of themselves as part of a
Canada-wide community, looking to a national court for redress of grievan-
ces even in areas of provincial jurisdiction.2"
Language rights are the arena in which this view of Canada comes into its
sharpest conflict with the view which emphasizes provincial autonomy.
Proponents of a charter of rights would say that it is a constitutional impera-
tive that French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians should be able to
move freely throughout the country, relying on national language rights to
assure some recognition of their language at least in governmental and edu-
cational institutions. Opponents would argue that provincial responsibility
for the enactment of laws, the supply of public services, the administration
ofjustice and education should include the power to stipulate the language in
which those functions are performed. Similar competing arguments may be
made on the question whether the provinces should retain the power to
24. My views are set out in Hogg,supra n. 2 at 432-434.
25. Alan C. Cairns, "Recent Federalist Constitutional Proposals" (1979) 5 Can. Public Policy
348 at 354.
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impose occupational, landholding, and commercial restrictions on non-
residents. At bottom the question is whether Canadian citizenship should
carry with it equal opportunities throughout the country - monitored by the
Supreme Court of Canada - or whether each province should be free to es-
tablish a distinctive linguistic, social and economic regime which best suits
its own majority. From the standpoint of federalism, these are the kinds of
questions which are raised by the proposal for a charter of rights.
V. PATRIATION AND AMENDMENT
A. Patriation
The "patriation" of the constitution is important for symbolic reasons, but
by itself it is of no significance to the balance of power between centre and re-
gions. However, if the ties with the United Kingdom were irrevocably cut,
and no other constitutional changes were made, there would be no way of
amending the B.N.A. Act. The substantive significance of patriation, there-
fore, is that it has to be accompanied by the inclusion in the constitution of an
amending procedure which would enable the constitution to be amended
without recourse to the United Kingdom.
B. Amendment
It is a notorious fact that Canadian governments have been trying to find
an amending formula without success since 1927. A major difficulty has
been the process by which the search has been undertaken. An assumption
has developed that the adoption of an amending formula - any amending
formula - should be accompanied by other changes in the constitution. The
amending formula has thus come to be regarded as just part of a package of
constitutional reforms. Needless to say, securing agreement on a package of
reforms is much more difficult than securing agreement on a single matter,
such as an amending formula. Exacerbating the package problem has been
the further assumption, shared until recently by the federal government as
well as the provinces, that no package of amendments should be proceeded
with unless it was unanimously agreed to by the federal government and all
the provincial governments.26 Thus the dissent of even one provincial
government would mean that a proposal for amendment could not be
proceeded with.
In 1964 agreement was nearly reached on the Fulton-Favreau formula.
That formula would have required the unanimous consent of the provinces,
as well as the federal government, for important amendments. Despite the
requirement of unanimity, which would have given Quebec (or any other
province) a veto over future changes, Quebec did not agree to this proposalr 21
and it was not pursued. In 1971 agreement was nearly reached on the
Victoria charter formula. That formula would have required the agreement
of a majority of provinces to amendments; but the majority had to include (1)
any province which had at any time at least 25 per cent of the population of
26. Note 4, supra, records a major constitutional initiative undertaken unilaterally by the
federal government after unsuccessful attempts to achieve agreement with the provinces
on a package of changes.
27. E. A. Forsey, Freedom and Order (1972) 235-237.
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Canada (this preserved a veto for Quebec and Ontario even if their relative
populations subsequently declined), (2) at least two of the Atlantic provinces,
and (3) at least two of the Western provinces that have combined populations
of at least 50 per cent of the population of all Western provinces. Despite the
requirement of Quebec's consent, Quebec did not agree to this proposal and it
was never pursued.28
Since 1971 it has become clear that the Victoria charter formula no longer
enjoys the support of some of the provinces which agreed to it in 1971.
British Columbia objects to the formula on the ground that it does not
recognize British Columbia as a region of Canada (the Pacific region)
separate from the prairie provinces (the Prairie region).2 s If the formula were
amended to require the consent of British Columbia then it would be accept-
able to British Columbia. 0 However, Alberta objects to the fact that the
formula accords greater recognition to Ontario, Quebec and (if British Col-
umbia gets its way) to British Columbia than it does to Alberta. In Alberta's
view, "an amending formula must reflect the principle that all provinces
have equal constitutional status and that an amending formula [must] reflect
the principle that existing rights, proprietary interests and jurisdiction of a
province cannot be diminished without the consent of that province".81 The
general idea seems to be that every province should have the right, if not to
block a proposed amendment, at least to prevent that amendment from
applying to it.
Despite the collapse in support for the Victoria charter formula, most of
the constitutional reform studies have advocated its adoption as Canada's
amending procedure. The widespread view has been that it avoids the
straightjacket of unanimity while still assuring that any amendment has
substantial support in each part of the country. No doubt this is why the Vic-
toria charter formula is included in the federal government's current
constitutional proposals. 2
VI. THE REFORM PROCESS
A. The present process
A basic fault in both the present process of seeking agreement to constitu-
tional amendments and the various new amending formulae which have
been proposed is their reliance on existing institutions of government.
Whether an amending process calls for the consent of a provincial Legisla-
ture or a provincial government, the reality is that it must be acceptable to
the government of that province. That means, of course, the Premier and his
cabinet. If the process requires the consent of the federal Parliament or the
federal government (as all proposed processes do), that means that it must be
acceptable to the Prime Minister and his cabinet.
28. Id. at 237-238.
29. Supra n. 12.
30. Government of British Columbia, British Columbia's Constitutional Proposals (1978)
99-104.
31. Government of Alberta, Harmony in Diversity (1978) 18-19.
32. Constitution Act, 1981, s. 45, as proposed in Proposed Resolution for a Joint Address to
Her Majesty the Queen respecting the Constitution of Canada; supra n. 4.
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So long as constitutional reform remains the preserve of the Prime Minis-
ter and the ten premiers, there are many matters that cannot even be placed
on the agenda, let alone agreed to. For example, there is a body of serious
opinion to the effect that our system of responsible parliamentary govern-
ment now gives too much power to the Prime Minister or Premier who heads
a government. The position of the President or a Governor in the United
States is the obvious comparison. Yet in all the discussion of central institu-
tions, there has been no proposal to diminish the powers of the Prime Minis-
ter (or Premier) vis-i-vis the legislative body to which he is responsible. Such
a proposal cannot even be discussed in Canada outside academic journals be-
cause all participants in the constitutional reform process have a vested
interest in resisting such a change. In other words, when constitutional
change must be initiated and agreed to by those who already wield the bulk of
political power there is a powerful reinforcement of the status quo. It has
been instructive to notice how vehemently the provincial premiers have
opposed the current federal plan to introduce the referendum as an alterna-
tive amending procedure. 3 This plan would remove the premiers from that
procedure. Of course, the Prime Minister would be equally opposed to it if the
referendum could be initiated by some body other than the federal Parlia-
ment which he controls. The fact is that the present participants in the
constitutional reform process are unlikely to agree to any significant restruc-
turing of governmental institutions. This is a serious constraint on the
process.
What each participant is willing to agree to are constitutional changes
which would enhance that participant's status or powers. However, such
changes normally involve some diminution in the status or powers of another
participant. This leads to a process of bargaining between Premiers and
Prime Minister which looks a lot more like labour-management negotiations
than the drafting of a constitution. Unlike labour-management negotiators,
however, the participants to constitutional discussions do not have a
sufficiently powerful incentive to reach agreement, and so agreement never
is reached. Perhaps this is just as well since it is hard to feel confidence in a
constitutional text (which has to last for a lot longer than a collective agree-
ment) arrived at by such methods.
B. Initiative and referendum
My own view, which I offer without the slightest expectation of its being
accepted by any political office-holder, is that we should adopt the old
western idea of "initiative and referendum".' One mode of constitutional
amendment - not the only mode, but one mode - should be some form of
initiative and referendum, under which a proposal for a constitutional
amendment could be initiated by petition signed by a stipulated (fairly large)
number of voters, and could be adopted by a referendum which obtained
majorities in each region of the country. What I have in mind is a procedure
which could by-pass entirely the existing political office-holders.
33. Id. at s. 46.
34. For discussion of the legal issues raised by the initiative and referendum law-making pro-
cess, as it was adopted in Alberta and Manitoba early this century, see Hogg, supra n. 2 at
218-223.
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It will no doubt be argued that Canadian experience with referenda or
plebiscites (as non-binding popular votes are more properly described) has
not been particularly happy, because they tend to be divisive. The only evi-
dence for that proposition is the conscription referendum of 1940, where
conscription was carried by a large English-speaking majority despite
French-speaking opposition. But not many issues have the potential to
divide the country like conscription. In any case, my proposal, like the
present federal proposals, would be that the referendum would have to carry
in each region in order to be effective. There would be no question of some
parts of the country using their votes to force through an amendment that
was unacceptable to other parts of the country.
Apart from the conscription question, surely the referendum has been per-
fectly satisfactory as the way to decide fundamental questions. That is how
the United Kingdom resolved its question whether to remain in the
European Economic Community. That is how Newfoundland decided to
enter Confederation. That is how Quebec rejected separatism. And that is
how Australia and Switzerland amend their constitutions. 5
The advantage of the referendum procedure would be that a single consti-
tutional proposal could be put forward and voted on without the necessity of
a prior agreement by all the governments to an entire package of
amendments. Under a referendum procedure, a desirable reform measure
could be examined on its own merits, instead of being treated as a bargaining
counter in a broader set of negotiations. It is not as if governments would be
excluded from the process. They could, and no doubt would, campaign for or
against any particular proposal, 6 but the campaign would have to be
addressed to the merits of the particular proposal. Support or opposition
could no longer be simply a bargaining ploy, because that obviously would
not persuade the voters.
The ability to put up a single proposal for amendment would exist under
the federal government's present proposals. But the trouble with these is
that the federal government is the only body with authority to initiate the
referendum process. It seems obvious that a provincial government, or at
least a group of provincial governments, should also have the power to
initiate the process - without federal consent. What I am recommending
now would go one step further than that by permitting the process to be
initiated by citizens. I would anticipate that a large number of signatures
35. In Australia, the process must be initiated by the federal Parliament; there is no provision
for a popular initiative: Constitution of Australia, s. 128. In Switzerland, the process can be
initiated either by the federal Assembly or by popular initiative. For a brief summary of the
Swiss amending process, see Government of Canada, The Canadian Constitution and Con-
stitutional Amendment (Federal-Provincial Relations Office, 1978) 4-5.
36. This is what happens in Australia, where state governments will often campaign against a
constitutional amendment which is supported by the federal government. The Australian
experience should also allay any fear that the federal government, with its large resources,
will always be able to win any referendum. In Australia since federation in 1900, 28
referenda have been held, embracing 50 proposed amendments, each of which was
supported by the federal government (which must initiate the process). Only six of the
referenda, embracing nine amendments, have carried by the required "double majority" (a
majority of all those voting, and a majority of those voting in each of a majority of states):
Christopher D. Gilbert, The Globe and Mail, December 13, 1980. A Canadian referendum,
if it required (as it should) a quintuple or sextuple majority (a majority of all those voting,
and a majority of those voting in each of four or five regions), would be even harder to win.
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would be required to ensure that there was widespread support for the
proposal."' Even so, it is possible that there would be some silly proposals, but
of course they would not carry. 38 The big advantage is that the procedure
would be available in support of proposals to amend the constitution which
were being blocked by the intransigence of executive-dominated
governments. It would mean that the ultimate control over the amending
process would rest where it ought to rest - with the people.
37. Switzerland requires 100,000 signatures: supra n. 34.
38. The expense of a lost referendum would not be entirely wasted if it tended to defuse the
issue by allowing proponents a "day in court" and demonstrating the extent of their popular
support.
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